The Roots of Empathy: A Lesson from Psychoanalysis  by Radenovic, Ljiljana
Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 30 (2011) 485 – 490
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2011.10.095
 
 
Procedia  
Social and 
Behavioral 
Sciences Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  00 (2011) 000–000 
www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia 
 
WCPCG-2011 
The Roots of Empathy: A Lesson from Psychoanalysis 
Ljiljana Radenovic a b * 
a Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, Cika Ljubina 18-20, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia, 
b Milton and Ethel Harris Research Initiative, York University, 4700 Keele St., Toronto, ON, Canada, M3J 1P3 
 
 
Abstract 
Despite considerable improvement in our understanding of empathy and its development, most contemporary empathy theories 
still do not provide a sufficiently detailed picture of the developmental mechanisms involved in empathic development. These 
theories are not particularly concerned with explaining how empathic emotional reactions and empathic understanding manifest 
themselves and develop in different individuals. As a result, they oversimplify the nature of the relation between affective and 
cognitive aspects of empathy and are not useful in clinical practice. This paper suggests that a closer look at psychoanalytic 
insights into empathy and empathic development can help us understand why we differ in our empathic capacities. This will shed 
more light on the way cognitive and affective aspects of empathy relate, helping us overcome the existing gap between 
theoretical models and clinical practice. 
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1. Introduction 
Unlike more traditional authors who had the tendency to reduce empathy to either an affective or cognitive 
capacity, contemporary empathy theorists usually conceptualise empathy as a complex phenomenon, consisting of a 
variety of different physiological, emotional, cognitive, and behavioural processes. Further, most acknowledge that 
the process of empathic development depends on the concomitant development of related psychological capacities 
(see e.g. Davis 1994, Eisenberg 1990, Hoffman 1984, Stotland 1969, Strayer 1987,Thompson 1987, 1998, Zahn-
Waxler and Radke-Yarrow 1990).  
However, despite considerable improvement in our understanding of empathy and its development, most 
contemporary empathy theories still do not provide a sufficiently detailed picture of the developmental mechanisms 
involved in empathic development. That is, they tend to identify only the most general, universal stages of empathic 
development, such as empathic distress, empathy for another‟s feelings, and the like (e.g. Hoffman 1984), or they 
focus on the evolutionary selected mechanisms for empathy, such as the perception-action mechanism (e.g. de Waal 
and Preston 2002).  However, neither group is particularly concerned with explaining how empathic emotional 
reactions and empathic understanding manifest themselves and develop in different individuals. What little 
discussion there is about why different people develop different empathic capacities usually centers on different life 
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experiences as the main cause of such differences. But exactly what these experiences are and how they contribute 
to the different ways we experience empathy on an everyday basis remains open. This paper suggests that the main 
reason for the shortcomings in current research on empathic development lies in the tendency of developmental 
theorists to focus on the development of human capacities (cognitive, affective, linguistic, social, and the like), 
while forgetting that it is a real human being (a real person) who is developing. As a result, the contemporary 
attempts to build a unified model of empathic development, such as Hoffman‟s (1984) or Preston and de Waal‟s 
(2002) have a mechanistic flavor and provide unsatisfactory accounts of the complexity of the empathic reactions 
we experience on an everyday basis. 
In this paper, I outline Hoffman‟s stage model of empathic development and argue that such approach has several 
important theoretical and practical implications. Firstly, stage models tend to oversimplify the nature of the relation 
between affective and cognitive aspects of empathy, describing only the most general way they relate. Secondly, 
they are not particularly useful when it comes to devising intervention strategies for people with empathic deficits. 
This brings me to the second point that I want to emphasize, namely that a psychological tradition that starts with 
different theoretical and practical goals, such as the tradition of psychoanalysis, does not face problems of this kind. 
Psychoanalysis, as a theory and a practice, originated in a clinical setting, and it primarily deals with cases of 
psychopathology. Its goal is to explain the origins of these pathologies on a case-by-case basis and to devise a 
therapy with the potential to help the patient. It is not surprising that one of the primary goals of psychoanalytic 
theory is to identify the developmental processes that contribute to the occurrence of individual differences in 
psychological capacities. That is, they are interested in why, and because of which circumstances, we end up being 
different persons. So in the case of empathic development, psychoanalysts are interested in how emotional 
development, and the development of personality and self-understanding (that unfolds through the close relationship 
and interaction between caregiver and child and is different for each dyad) influence the development of empathic 
understanding and empathic emotional reactions (see e.g. Beres and Arlow 1974, Bergman and Wilson 1984, Fliess 
1942, Kaplan 1976, Kohut 1959, 1971, 1977, 1980, 1984, Mahler, Pine and Bergman, 1975, Spitz 1965, Sullivan 
1953).    
          Building on this point, I conclude that a closer look at the psychoanalytic models of psychological 
development and empathic development will have two important implications. Firstly, this shift of attention from 
stages of empathic development to personality development, emotional development, and mother-child interaction 
will open the way for better understanding how affective and cognitive aspects of empathy relate and shape each 
other during development. Secondly, given that further empirical research in this direction would help us identify 
factors contributing to both normal and impaired empathic development (and would reveal why we differ so widely 
in our empathic capacity) such research would certainly help us devise better intervention strategies for people with 
empathic deficits.  
2. Development of empathy as a universal human capacity: Hoffman’s developmental model 
While many developmental psychologists have been interested in the development of empathy, Hoffman (1975, 
1978, 1984, 1987) is one of the rare few to work out a model of empathic development. In devising such a model, 
Hoffman‟s goals were to determine the main stages of empathic development, and to identify the main factors that 
contribute to the transformation of primitive empathic responses into more advanced forms of empathy. Being aware 
that advanced empathy requires a great deal of sophistication in emotional and cognitive functioning, Hoffman 
aimed to account for the relation between affective and cognitive capacities and the way each contributes to the 
development of empathy. For this reason, Hoffman‟s model of empathic development is usually referred to as the 
affective-cognitive synthesis (Davis 1994).  
Although Hoffman defines empathy as “an affective response more appropriate to someone else‟s situation than 
to one‟s own” (Hoffman 1987, 48), he also argues that the precise nature of the affective response depends to a great 
extent on the cognitive capabilities of the individual. In other words, the nature of empathic response we are capable 
of experiencing depends on the mechanisms or modes of arousal by which we come to react affectively to others. 
Furthermore, these mechanisms differ with respect to how much cognitive and linguistic sophistication they require. 
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They range from the more primitive and automatic, such as primary circular reaction, motor mimicry, and classical 
conditioning, to the more advanced mechanisms that require complex cognitive processing, such as language-
mediated association, and perspective taking. The nature of empathic response also depends on the way we 
conceptualise other people, or our cognitive sense of others. Hoffman‟s phrase „cognitive sense of others‟ refers to 
the way in which we mentally represent other people and the relation between others and ourselves.  
Admittedly, Hoffman‟s model of empathic development has great value as an attempt to establish what cognitive 
capacities are necessary for empathic anger, compassion, and general concern for the other. However, it is not of 
much help when we want to explain how, in what circumstances, or why different people understand other people in 
different ways, and why they feel differently.  That is, we often witness that some people are more empathetic than 
others, even though they have all reached the final stage in the development of the cognitive sense of others, have 
quite normal perspective-taking capacities, and have a basic understanding of the nature and the causes of emotions. 
Some people may be very good in understanding how other people feel and can be capable of taking the perspective 
of others, but show little emotional engagement. Others can be quite compassionate, but may be poor at reading 
subtle cues and incapable of deeper empathic understanding. Situations/emotions that might move some people, may 
leave others indifferent (even when all are good perspective takers and have a clear picture of how the other person 
feels). Furthermore, the nature of emotional reactions among these people might differ. When exposed to the same 
situation, some people may feel distress and fear, while others feel compassion and pity and still others, empathetic 
anger.  Therefore, it seems that the cognitive sense of others, and perspective-taking capacities, as well as advanced 
understanding of emotions (when understood as psychological mechanisms that bring about empathic reactions) do 
not say much about what emotional reactions people will have or why differences occur. In short, these concepts are 
helpful when we want to describe general conditions for advanced empathy, but not when we want to explain how, 
in what circumstances, or why different people feel empathy.  
Now, if we are to understand why different people feel empathy in different ways, we must move away from 
concepts such as cognitive sense of other, theory of mind, general perspective taking abilities, and the like, and try 
to unpack what it means to understand how another human being feels in a particular situation. This is not to say that 
the way we conceptualize others (or our cognitive sense of others) is irrelevant in how we make sense of other 
people‟s feelings. However, such general knowledge, while it is a necessary condition, it is not in itself sufficient for 
the way we understand and feel for others on an everyday basis. Besides this general condition, we need to identify 
other factors that contribute to different ways and levels in which we understand and make sense of each other in 
particular situations. We find hints of where we should be looking for such factors (and why) in the psychoanalytic 
literature. 
 
3. A lesson from psychoanalysis 
 
Based on knowledge gleaned from clinical practice, psychoanalysts are aware that getting to know patients‟ 
thoughts and feelings and arriving at the correct interpretation of their inner lives is a long, painstaking process that 
can go astray, fall into traps, or stagnate for long periods. Moreover, they know that whether the analyst reaches a 
deeper level of empathic understanding in any given case depends on what kind of people the therapist and patient 
are. Individual therapists tend to be more sensitive to a particular kind of emotional experience and to the particular 
way the patient communicates it, while not being well attuned to others. Also, in order for a therpaist to get a better 
sense of the patient, she needs to have highly sophisticated self-reflection and self-understanding. That is, the 
therapist needs to be able to detect when she is misreading the patient‟s cues and to correct herself.  
Almost all clinical vignettes illustrate this point. For instance, when trying to account for her failure to reach 
empathic understanding with her patient, Mrs. G, Evelyn Schwaber (1984) describes their interaction in the 
following way: 
 
There was a discrepancy between the image she portrayed [Mrs. G] and the one she experienced – at least some 
difficulty in my capacity to understand her. I thought about the possibility that the patient may have had defensive 
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reasons for insisting on a negative image… But this was an inferential explanation which did not arise from the data 
offered by the patient, and which I realized I may have been especially tempted to seek, precisely because there was 
a gap – which I would hope to bridge – in my capacity to gain attunement…There is another dimension in 
considering my difficulty in trying to make sense of the imagery Mrs. G. conveyed. It spoke to the feeling I had that 
I so often seemed to lose her, to how I had to grope and struggle to find my place in her experiential world, while yet 
trying to maintain my own self-reflective vigil, for there was a quality of affectlessness about Mrs. G., a kind of 
lifelessness, with no manifest warmth. Unfortunately, often only retrospectively did I become aware that I had been 
impatient, fatigued, or bored; perhaps in some way, these were self-protective withdrawals out of the intense 
immersion in her experience. Often the clues of such responses on my part were signalled by subtle shifts in the 
patient‟s communication – as a change in tone, or sounding more mechanized, or some shift in the style of her 
associations. (Schwaber 1984, 164)  
 
The analysis of the particular dynamics between Schwaber and her patient, including the setbacks and the 
obstacles encountered, as well as the self-reflection that helped her to get back on track, elucidates, among other 
things, the fact that the process of getting to know another person goes through different stages, is qualitatively 
different from case to case, and requires a highly sophisticated capacity for self-reflection.  
Thus, therapeutic situations indicate that neither self-understanding (how we look at and make sense of our own 
thoughts, feelings, expectations, and hopes) nor understanding of other people (how they think and feel, what they 
want, expect, and hope for) can be reduced to simple, mechanic, linear processes implicitly suggested by stage 
models. Nor they can be accounted for by the general capacity of perspective taking or a cognitive sense of others. If 
taken seriously, this point has important implications for our understanding of how empathic capacity develops. 
That is, given that our empathic capacity needs to be seen as highly dependant on our own sense of self, its 
development needs to be understood and explained within the context of personality development. This means that a 
full account of the development of empathy must examine the origins of personality.  
Although there is no unified view in the psychoanalytic literature on the relation between empathic development 
and personality development, there are two questions that have been important to psychoanalysts: how empathy 
between mother and a child contributes to personality development, and how personality development contributes to 
development of empathy. Although most of the interest has been on the former, some psychoanalysts have tackled 
the latter. 
While the question of the role of empathy in the development of self has not been particularly important for 
classical psychoanalysts, it has become crucial for interpersonal psychoanalysts (e.g. Sullivan 1953), object relation 
theorists (e.g. Fairbairn 1943, 1944, Klein 1952, Mahler 1975, Winnicott 1965), and self psychologists (e.g. Kohut 
1959, 1971, 1977, 1980, 1984). There are at least two reasons for the increased interest in empathy in the new 
psychoanalytic schools. Firstly, most new schools have abandoned the Freudian conception of drives as the basic 
mechanism of development and have centered instead on social relationships (primarily that between mother and a 
child). Secondly, these new schools are characterized by an emerging interest in the development of self and the 
shift of focus from the emergence of the superego to ego development. Within these new trends, where the driving 
forces of the development of self are not located in the infant‟s instinctual drives, but in her inherently social needs 
(i.e. in the interpersonal field), the role of empathy as an emotional link between a child and a caregiver has become 
more important. Furthermore, given the emphasis these models put on normal mother-child interaction in the 
constitution and the development of the self, the interest in normal levels of empathic care (and how empathetic 
mothers are toward their infants) has increased considerably. 
Although the role of empathy in the development of the cohesive self during the first year of life has been central 
to object relation theorists and self psychologists, the question of how empathic capacity per se develops has usually 
been left on the back burner. Even so, some authors, such as Bergman and Wilson (1984) and Kaplan (1976) have 
attempted to develop a more comprehensive model of empathic development, one which accord with a general 
psychoanalytic understanding of psychological development. Despite some differences (mostly in terminology and 
focus), both models share a general view of personality development and the role of mother/child interaction in this 
489Ljiljana Radenovic / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 30 (2011) 485 – 490 Ljiljana Radenovic / Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 00 (2011) 000–000 
 5 
development. Both show how the insight that empathy needs to be understood within the more general context of 
self-understanding and personality development, has led developmental psychoanalysts to relate early origins of 
empathy to the development of the sense of self.  Furthermore, in these two models, the development of the sense of 
self is seen as the result of both the interaction between a child and a caregiver in the first year of life and the child‟s 
general emotional development.  
This connection between empathic capacity, sense of self, emotional development, and the early interaction 
between a child and a caregiver is of crucial importance for several reasons. For one thing, it highlights the fact that 
the way we understand ourselves and the way we understand others (and how we acquire such understanding) are 
co-determined; in other words, the way we see ourselves is intrinsically connected to and depends on the way we 
conceptualize other people. For another thing, our sense of self and others, not to mention the way we emotionally 
react to others, has its origins in the first emotional exchanges between a child and a caregiver. As a result, within 
the psychoanalytic framework, emotional development becomes the cornerstone of the development of social 
cognition. Thus, the psychoanalytic models of empathic development (such as Kaplan‟s or Bergman and Wilson‟s) 
can address the problem of individual differences in empathic capacity among people. Given that each child 
participates in slightly (albeit sufficiently) different interactions with the caregiver, where the communication 
between the caregiver and a child breaks down at different times and in different ways, each child becomes 
emotionally sensitive to different situations, develops a unique sense of self and a unique way of approaching and 
understanding others. These differences are directly reflected in the different levels of empathy among different 
people.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Psychoanalytic insights about the nature of empathic understanding and its origins can be of great help in further 
research on empathic development. To begin, drawing on their clinical practice, psychoanalytic authors provide 
conceptual reasons for relating empathic understanding with personality development. That is, they indicate the 
complexity of the process of empathic understanding and how much it depends on what kind of persons we are. In 
addition, within their developmental framework, personality development is rooted in early emotional development 
and mother-child interaction, as are empathic capacity and early social understanding.  
If taken seriously, the aforementioned conceptual points would steer the theories of social cognition and empathy 
away from stage models (that conceptualize the relation between cognitive and affective aspects of empathy in the 
most general terms), opening open the way for an integrative model of empathic development. Such a model would 
shed more light on the way cognitive and affective aspects of empathy relate in development by placing them in 
more general context of personality development. Such a model would also open the way for new studies indicating 
how a mother‟s responses might shape a child‟s emotional reactivity and empathic understanding (e.g. responses 
typical for maternal depression, abusive behaviour, and the like), as well as how a child‟s initial sensory reactivity to 
outside stimuli and her sensory perception might contribute to normal or disrupted interaction with a caregiver (that 
consequently leads to normal or disrupted development of empathy). Finally, once we have a clearer picture of all 
the factors involved in empathic development, we will be in a better position to advance clinical practice and 
develop therapies for people with empathic deficits.  This would help us overcome the unfortunate gap between 
theoretical models that are too general to provide a firm basis for clinical practice and current therapies that are 
based on long clinical experience but not substantiated by experimental studies. 
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